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A Framework for Luck Egalitarianism in Health and Healthcare*  
Andreas Albertsen and Carl Knight 
Abstract 
Several attempts have been made to apply the choice-sensitive theory of distributive justice, 
luck egalitarianism, in the context of health and healthcare. This article presents a 
framework for this discussion by highlighting different normative decisions to be made in 
such an application, some of the objections to which luck egalitarians must provide answers 
and some of the practical implications associated with applying such an approach in the real 
world. It is argued that luck egalitarians should address distributions of health rather than 
healthcare, endorse an integrationist theory that combines health concerns with general 
distributive concerns, and be pluralist in their approach. It further suggests that choice-
sensitive policies need not be the result of applying luck egalitarianism in this context. 
Luck egalitarianism is an influential theory of distributive justice. The theory has been 
described in several ways. One common account requires that the effects of luck, 
understood as the inverse of responsibility, be neutralized.[1–3]  Another, non-equivalent 
account has it that “it is bad if some people are worse off than others through no voluntary 
fault or choice of their own.” [4–6] The common feature of these accounts is the distributive 
significance they assign to the distinction between the chosen (associated with 
responsibility and the voluntary) and the unchosen (luck, or the absence of the voluntary). 
It is sometimes argued that luck egalitarianism, with its focus on personal 
responsibility, can make a valuable contribution to our moral assessment in the complicated 
areas of health and healthcare.[7–11] There could be a practical need for such a 
contribution, since references to personal responsibility are frequent in policy 
discussion.[12–16] However, several writers remain unconvinced of such an application and 
have raised important critiques in that regard.[17–27]  
A comprehensive application of luck egalitarianism in health and healthcare would 
presumably require a specification of what luck egalitarianism means. Due to the 
heterogeneity of the luck egalitarian literature, such a specification involves taking sides on 
several difficult issues. This would include (but not necessarily be limited to) how advantage 
should be measured, what constitutes choice, and whether we address only inequalities not 
reflecting those or also equalities.[10] We will not add to this vast literature here. Instead 
we present a framework to serve as a useful guide for applying luck egalitarianism (however 
construed) to health and healthcare. After setting out the framework we address significant 
criticism of luck egalitarian approaches to health and healthcare, and finally deal with 
several real-world issues raised by such approaches.  
 
Questions 
In this section we consider some questions that we believe arise for all attempts to apply 
luck egalitarianism to health and healthcare. The theoretical choices presented in this 
section concern the normative core of such an application. 
 
                                                          
* This article was published in the Journal of Medical Ethics, 41, 165-169. The published version is available at 
http://jme.bmj.com/content/41/2/165.abstract. Funding: Oticon Foundation (grant number 12-4238), 
Augustinus Foundation (grant number 12-4996), British Academy (grant number pf100118). 
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Health. When assessing the fairness of distributions in relation to health from a luck 
egalitarian perspective, which health-related goods should we ultimately be concerned 
with? One proposal is concerned with inequalities in people’s access to (or opportunity for) 
healthcare. Such an account is thus attentive to unchosen differences in distance to 
hospitals, co-payments, treatment outcomes and other things related to the healthcare 
system. This position, which we could call the healthcare view, is prominent in much earlier 
work on distributive justice in this area.[9,28–30] A concern for healthcare has been 
defended on the basis of the benefits healthcare provides,[31] as reflecting the fact that 
delivering the just amount of health is not within society’s control,[28] and on the grounds 
that treating people as equal involves supplying them with equal access to healthcare 
without considering the health effects of such a provision [29].The main alternative view is 
concerned with distributions of health as such. Inspired by the recurrent confirmation of the 
importance of social determinants to people’s health,[32,33] this broader view means that 
sources of inequalities in health that are unrelated to the healthcare system are also a 
concern.[10] Call this the health view.  
We are inclined to accept the  health view. While we cannot claim to provide a full 
argument for this position we offer an example to support it. If we have a fixed amount of 
money at our disposal to spend on any initiative, should we let the health view or the 
healthcare view guide us? If it is healthcare that is our focus, we would opt for measures 
that increase access to healthcare. Guiding us to give priority to preventive health visits in 
vulnerable areas or mandatory health checkups initially seems to speak favorably for the 
healthcare view. But assuming the availability of another policy that left the access to 
healthcare as it is, but provides a larger increase in health for the group in question, this 
conclusion seems less obvious. If initiatives such as providing apples in schools, cleaner air 
or better sewage systems would result in a larger increase in health, how are we to choose 
between such initiatives and those who increase the access to healthcare? On the 
healthcare view we don’t have much choice, since only the first group of initiatives affects 
access to healthcare. On the health view we can prefer whichever gives the greatest health 
benefit for the group in question. We believe this to be the most plausible scale to evaluate 
alternate initiatives. The initial appeal of the healthcare view might be derived from its 
perceived positive effect on people’s health. When alternatives not related to healthcare do 
better in providing health benefits, it becomes apparent that health as such should be our 
concern.  
 
Integration. Luck egalitarians can differ in how they perceive the relationship between the 
concerns of justice in health and healthcare and other concerns of justice. The question here 
is whether we are proposing a theory dealing specifically with health alone, or one 
considering it in relation to other concerns of justice as well. Borrowing a terminology used 
by Caney on another topic, we could refer to the former approach as the isolationist view, 
while calling the latter the integrationist view.[34] The former seems prominent in medical 
ethics, where the relationship to other spheres is often opaque or unaddressed.[35–37] This 
means that the literature often addresses health as a separate issue, rather than as an issue 
interconnected with other issues of justice. One instance where this would make a 
difference is in relation to an unchosen health disadvantage which we cannot remove. An 
isolationist theory of health would say that this unfortunate state of affairs cannot be 
remedied. The integrationist view, on the other hand, could recommend addressing the 
shortfall in advantage located in the sphere of health by compensating the person in some 
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other way not associated with health. Increased public spending targeted to individuals of 
this sort would be one way of doing this. For instance, if we found that members of the 
working class had systematic health disadvantages, only some of which could be removed in 
a reasonable timescale, we could respond by providing improved public education for this 
group. 
While some may find this an attractive suggestion, we imagine that not all will.  The 
integrationist view is, however, supported by two further considerations. The first is that 
isolationist approaches risk imposing burdens on people who experience unchosen 
disadvantages in every sphere of life except health, thus increasing rather than decreasing 
the extent to which their lives as a whole reflect unchosen circumstances. Suppose A has 
little money, an unsatisfying job, and an overall below-average standard of life, while B is 
rich, loves his work, and generally has a wonderful life. If A’s health is but a little better than 
B’s, the isolationist view would recommend prioritizing improvements to B’s health. This will 
work to reduce or eliminate the one advantage A has over B, and expand the inequality in 
their overall life prospects.  This would seem at odds with luck egalitarianism in general. 
Integrationism, by contrast, can take into account these wider considerations. As a further 
suggestion of the viability of the integrationist view, consider another example, where we 
have to choose between different policies. Initiatives y and z would have equal effects on 
people’s health, but z also decreases unchosen economic inequality. An isolationist theory 
cannot prefer one over the other, while an integrationist view would be readily equipped to 
prefer the initiative which best satisfies other concerns of justice. The choice we make in 
whether to develop an integrationist or isolationist theory thus has important implications 
for the policies such a theory would recommend and which inequalities it would address.  
 
Plurality. It seems very likely that there is a plurality of relevant values. Almost all luck 
egalitarians recognize that luck egalitarianism must be complemented by principles 
reflecting other values.[1,4,10,38] There are, in our view, compelling reasons for doing this, 
one of which is the leveling down objection to egalitarianism.[5] It points out that, that 
while luck egalitarianism tells us to correct any unchosen inequalities between C and D, it 
does not by itself tell us that we should prefer to do so by increasing C’s advantage level 
rather than by decreasing D’s advantage level.[10]  
Given that most luck egalitarians endorse a pluralist view rather than a monist view, 
and have good reasons for doing so, the most interesting question in this area is which other 
values should be taken into account. One form of pluralism would be to cite values to be 
balanced against the assessments made by luck egalitarianism. Within a healthcare context, 
candidate values include respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and 
utility.[35] A different approach would be to introduce another distributive value instead of 
(or as a supplement to) egalitarianism. This  value could be prioritarian, giving more weight 
to people’s interests the lower their absolute level of health or healthcare,[10,39] or 
sufficientarian, keeping people above a certain threshold of advantage.[40] Combining luck 
egalitarianism with prioritarianism supplements the concern with whether people’s relative 
share reflects unchosen circumstances with a concern for their absolute level of advantage. 
Combining luck egalitarianism with sufficientarianism supplements the concern with 
whether people’s relative share reflects unchosen circumstances with a concern for keeping 
people above the specified threshold. 
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Objections 
Luck egalitarianism has been met by important objections. Since some of the most powerful 
objections draw their strength from pointing towards its application in relation to health 
and healthcare it might be said that such an application is a hard case for luck 
egalitarianism. In light of the framework developed above, we discuss three prominent 
critiques. 
Respect. One powerful objection has been proposed by Wolff. He argues that the process of 
collecting the data needed for luck egalitarian institutions to function and for implementing 
choice-sensitive policies will fail at the important egalitarian task of showing equal respect 
towards all people.[41] According to Wolff it is possible that luck egalitarian institutions will 
fail to show common courtesy, show distrust towards its potential claimants or require 
shameful revelations from the people under assessment. While it is hard to think of a lack of 
common courtesy as an integral part of any policy, it seems to be the case for the 
application of luck egalitarianism in health that some policies will require the gathering of 
information about past behaviors and circumstances so that we cannot design a luck 
egalitarian policy without one or more of the features Wolff describes. 
 On reflection luck egalitarians would have (at least) two distinct ways of dealing with 
this critique. It is reasonable to expect that treating any individual in the fashion described 
by Wolff would result in a loss of welfare. Such welfare losses could and should be a concern 
for a welfarist luck egalitarian and can potentially outweigh the other luck egalitarian 
reasons that support the introduction of an overtly choice-sensitive policy.[42] For instance, 
if we accept that many obese people are responsible for their obesity and consequent 
health problems, we have a luck egalitarian reason for wanting to identify these people so 
we can pass costs on to them. But it may be that the investigations needed to distinguish 
these people from other obese people who are not responsible for their condition would be 
so demeaning and consequently costly in welfare terms for the latter group that such a 
policy would increase unchosen inequality. A second luck egalitarian response is that even if 
we could allocate costs to the first group of obese people (those responsible for their 
condition) without imposing costs on the second (non-responsible) group, we should not do 
so on pluralist grounds. For instance, many of the obese might be badly off in absolute 
terms and so be of particular concern for prioritarianism, or be in danger of falling below the 
sufficientarian threshold. As we have seen pluralistic luck egalitarianism can respond to 
concerns such as these. For these reasons, luck egalitarian goals might better be served by a 
seemingly choice-insensitive policy, which does not allocate any special costs to any of the 
obese. In other words, this choice-sensitive theory of egalitarian justice may be best served 
by a choice-insensitive rule of regulation.[43]  
 
Harshness. This objection concerns how luck egalitarianism treats those who end up worse 
off as a consequence of their own choices.[44,45] Fleurbaey offered the colorful example of 
the uninsured motorcyclist, who is badly injured while carelessly riding without a helmet 
and left to his fate by luck egalitarianism.[45] This kind of case is important since it is 
routinely put forward  in order to criticize the application of luck egalitarianism in 
health,[22,26] and is also acknowledged as a significant obstacle among those more drawn 
to luck egalitarianism.[10,46]  
One possible response would be to argue that cases of luck egalitarian harshness are 
too rare in a real world context to suffice for the rejection of luck egalitarianism.[47] But 
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though such a practical argument might have some plausibility it leaves the theoretical 
relevance of the harshness critique untouched.[48] When a pluralistic approach is 
introduced, however, it is clear that we can deal with the critique in several ways. For 
instance, prioritarianism allows us to have special concern for people with very low levels of 
advantage, even where they are responsible for their condition, while sufficientarianism 
would allow us to care for them if they fall under a specified threshold. In a similar fashion 
an adherent to the value of beneficence, which holds that there is an obligation to benefit 
others, would allow us to care for people such as the motorcyclist. 
    
Promotion. Norman Daniels has voiced the objection against luck egalitarianism that its 
concern for whether distributions reflect people’s choices makes it unfit as an approach to 
health. The reason for this is that this concern for responsibility surpasses a concern for 
health promotion in a seemingly implausible way. To see why this might be so consider a 
case where institutions are in place that make sure that only unchosen inequalities 
(however construed) are eliminated, while chosen ones are left untouched. In such a 
situation why would luck egalitarians prefer that people made healthy choices rather than 
unhealthy? [20] The point made by Daniels is essentially that luck egalitarians can prefer 
that a distribution reflect people’s choices, but cannot prefer that some choices rather than 
others occur, provided institutional measures ensure that others are not asked to bear the 
cost of these choices. This critique is specifically relevant in the context of health, since it 
claims that luck egalitarianism is unable to support initiatives to promote healthy lifestyles 
and thus, that many aspects of health promotion seem unattainable for luck egalitarianism. 
Pluralism again seems to be an important part of a possible luck egalitarian answer 
here. For instance, if we are prioritarians, we will have direct reasons for wanting to make 
sure that people, and especially the worst off, achieve good health outcomes. This is the 
case because the prioritarian concern allows us to care even for those, who are responsible 
for their plight. We would therefore have grounds for favouring the promotion of healthy 
lifestyle choices.  
 
Applications 
In the foregoing sections we have set out an approach to luck egalitarianism in the area of 
health and healthcare, and defended it against some common objections. In this final 
section we consider how this approach bears on several important real world issues of 
public health and healthcare allocation. 
 
Scarcity. Many distributive decisions involve some form of scarcity. It is therefore crucial to 
determine, whether scarcity changes our evaluation of a distribution. One view could be 
that scarcity makes considerations other than need, such as responsibility, irrelevant.[49] 
However, an alternative view suggests that when scarcity forces tough choices upon us, we 
must see first to those who are least responsible for their current disadvantage.  
Luck egalitarianism comes down firmly on the side of the second view. On this view, 
there is nothing about scarcity that would make it appropriate to disregard responsibility 
considerations. And on further consideration, why should the presence of scarcity have a 
bearing on which fundamental moral considerations should come into play?  Many 
decisions are affected by scarcity and it seems odd to suggest that we should, in situations 
where we have the least amount of resources and are least able to bring about more, 
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invoke principles less attentive to whether people have some responsibility for their need 
for resources. Luck egalitarianism therefore suggests that those who are responsible for 
their need for a scarce resource should, all else being equal, receive lower priority than 
those who are not in this way responsible.  
However, it should be emphasized that luck egalitarianism is a view about how to 
respond to responsibility, not a view about who is in fact responsible for bringing about 
what. Consider, for example, the seemingly responsibility-sensitive policy of giving lower 
priority to people whose need for a new liver is related to alcohol consumption. While luck 
egalitarianism under certain empirical conditions and on a specific theory of responsibility is 
compatible with such a policy, it is not an integral part of luck egalitarianism to claim that 
this group of patients is in fact responsible for their condition. We again find that luck 
egalitarianism does not provide the unmitigated support for real world attempts at ‘choice-
sensitive’ policies that many suppose it to. 
 
Financing. Another issue is who should pay for the healthcare system and health promoting 
policies. This is important since healthcare expenditures claim a large share of the national 
budget in developed countries. In the EU, for example, member states spend on average 9% 
of GDP on health and healthcare, while the US spends twice this amount.[50,51] If we 
believe that people should contribute to healthcare expenditures in accordance with their 
health-related choices, as luck egalitarianism seems (with some provisos) to suggest, several 
options are available.  
One approach would be to make those deemed responsible for their own bad health  
contribute through out-of-pocket payments to the costs associated with their treatment. 
Such a scheme however does risk that many people will be unable to pay the considerable 
costs. An alternative would be to tax activities or consumer products likely to result in bad 
health.[7] A related option is insurance schemes where the insurance premium reflects 
people’s behavior, with some  proposing a scheme of mandatory insurance.[52,53] Both the 
tax and mandatory insurance options do, however, involve placing unavoidable costs on 
people whose risky behavior in the end does not result in bad health, a controversial 
outcome in the luck egalitarian literature.[54,55]  
The last possibility to be mentioned is a financing scheme, where healthcare and 
health policies are financed through general taxation. At first this might seem a bit at odds 
with the luck egalitarian perspective of this article, since it makes no straightforward 
attempt to place the burden of finance upon those who take risks with their health or end 
up creating expenses in the healthcare system. An isolationist view would tend to favor such 
a dismissive verdict. But from an integrationist perspective, it might be considered. If health 
is an element we care about along with other things, then in a society with significant 
unchosen inequalities in wealth, we should worry if a responsibility-sensitive financing of 
healthcare would increase such inequalities, while a general taxation scheme that places the 
heaviest burden on the rich might all things considered be the solution which most reduced 
the degree to which the distribution reflected unchosen circumstances. This means that luck 
egalitarianism on our view does not necessarily come down in favor of a system where out-
of-pocket payments, insurance schemes or other mechanisms make sure that the ill pay for 
their own treatment to a significant extent. When we know that the burden of disease is 
borne disproportionally by the poor[56], we may have luck egalitarian reasons to prefer a 
system more similar to that of Canada or Western Europe, where general taxation on the 
rich benefits the poor through improved public health care provision. 
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Consequences. Even if we assume luck egalitarianism and some degree of responsibility for 
bad health it is not in itself obvious which practical consequences should follow from that 
responsibility. This follows partly from the wide range of measures we could employ 
towards such an end. We could vary the quality of care people receive, the price they pay 
for their treatment, or their place in a queue for scarce resources (and any combination of 
such measures). 
The evaluation of these measures depends on a number of considerations. These 
might include the expected benefit of treatment, the cost of treatment in relation to the 
patient’s wealth, and the extent to which the person is responsible for his condition. For 
instance, increasing a patients’ proportion of treatment costs may seem more appealing the 
less urgent the treatment, the lower the cost of the treatment, the richer the patient, and 
the more responsible the patient is for the medical need. It should also be taken into 
account which other responsibility-tracking measures are already in place. It would matter, 
presumably, whether people’s behavior has already had some kind of consequence through 
specific taxes, higher insurance premiums, or similar. 
Taking these points together, it may be that, in countries with high levels of tax on 
tobacco and in which smokers are disproportionately poor, smokers who develop lung 
cancer should usually be relieved of paying the financial costs of their treatment because 
they have already paid significant costs via taxes, often have little capacity for paying more, 
and may be considered to have less than full responsibility for their smoking for 
socioeconomic reasons. By contrast, if the victims of skiing accidents have not paid high 
taxes on their risky behavior and are typically wealthy, it may be reasonable to expect a 
patient contribution. The specific consequences which follow from risky behavior depend on 
several factors and are unlikely to be uniform across different categories of disease and 
injury. 
 
Conclusion 
Above we tried to present what we consider a viable framework for luck egalitarianism in 
health. The purpose has been to bring forth distinctions and concepts which we believe can 
advance the debate about luck egalitarianism in this context. The purpose of this article has 
for the most part been an exploration of concepts, rather than an attempt to argue for our 
own convictions. On three central themes we have, however, argued for our own view. Luck 
egalitarians should address distributions of health rather than healthcare, endorse an 
integrationist theory that combines health concerns with general distributive concerns, and 
be pluralist in their approach.We also discussed what we consider to be some of the most 
important objections against such an application of luck egalitarianism. Finally we addressed 
real world topics such as medical scarcity, health financing schemes, and institutional 
approaches to introducing personal responsibility to health policies. A further point that 
arises from the discussion is that one should be careful not to leap too quickly from a 
choice-sensitive theory of egalitarian justice to a choice-sensitive rule of regulation. We 
have seen that there may sometimes be good luck egalitarian reasons for pursuing choice-
insensitive policies.  
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